The relationship between the Emirates and the Saudis has been deteriorating for several years. Old grudges go back to the 1974 Jeddah Treaty, which was supposed to settle disputed borders. The Emirates claim they were forced to hand over oil-rich territory (the Shaybah field) and a land corridor linking the country to Qatar in exchange for Saudi recognition of their independence.
In the early 2000s tensions flared again when Saudi Arabia blocked Emirati maritime infrastructure projects, claiming they crossed its territorial waters. There were even naval incidents involving coast guard vessels.
In Yemen the rift became glaringly obvious. In 2018-2019, UAE-backed forces clashed directly with troops of the internationally recognized government, which were supported by Saudi Arabia. Heavy fighting broke out in Aden, with dozens killed and wounded as separatists seized parts of the city.
A brief calm followed. Then, between December 2025 and January 2026, the STC, heavily backed by Abu Dhabi, advanced and seized the governorates of Hadramaut and Mahra, precisely the ones bordering Saudi Arabia. Riyadh responded with airstrikes on ships and cargoes linked to the UAE, accused Abu Dhabi of threatening national security, and gave a 24-hour ultimatum for Emirati forces to leave Yemen. After the withdrawal, the STC itself was weakened and partially dismantled.
The Emirates weren’t just supporting the takeover of cities on the Saudi border, they were planning to overthrow the Yemeni government. What began as a coalition against the Houthis turned into an open dispute over influence, ports, and control of southern Yemen. The UAE bet on separatists and proxies; the Saudis prioritized central government unity and their own border security.
With overflowing coffers in recent years, the Emirates began running their own highly interventionist foreign policy. The country is now involved in at least eight conflicts across Africa and plans to expand its influence, always in partnership with Israel.
In Somaliland, the Berbera base operates under tight coordination between the Emirates and Israel. But the cooperation goes far beyond that base. On the arid, remote islands of the Socotra archipelago in Yemen, the UAE built a network of military and intelligence bases. Israeli officers are on site, operating radars, drones, and Israeli equipment integrated into the system. The entire network was developed in direct coordination with Israel to monitor the Houthis and control the Gulf of Aden.
The Emirates chose Israel as a strategic partner years ago, but during the war against Iran and the truce period it was the first time Israeli soldiers operated equipment on Emirati soil. In fact, it was the first time the Iron Dome was deployed anywhere outside Israel or the United States.
None of this pleased Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia is now acting on two direct fronts to curb UAE influence: Sudan and Somaliland.
On April 20, MBS received Sudanese Army chief General Burhan in Jeddah. In addition to the high-level meeting, Riyadh is financing and guaranteeing a major $1.5 billion arms deal with Pakistan to equip Burhan’s forces, while also increasing direct financial and logistical support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which are fighting the Rapid Support Forces financed by the Emirates.
This makes it clear that the Saudis will go after any conflict or position the Emirates are building. The rivalry that exploded in Yemen and was cemented by the UAE’s exit from OPEC+ is now spreading to Sudan, where Riyadh wants a stable central government to secure the Red Sea and control of Port Sudan, while the UAE prefers a fragmented Sudan to maintain influence through ports and business with the RSF.
The Saudi offensive also targets Somaliland, the rebel territory that declared independence from Somalia and was recognized by Israel and the Emirates. Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a firm ally of the Somali central government, which recently canceled all military and port agreements with the Emirates in protest against Abu Dhabi’s support for Somaliland.
While the Emirati company DP World invested more than $440 million to modernize the port of Berbera in Somaliland, Saudi Arabia signed new military and security cooperation agreements with the Somali central government in 2026 to strengthen its presence in the Gulf of Aden. Riyadh openly criticized Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence, a move engineered by the Emirates, viewing it as destabilizing to Somali unity.
The Saudis are moving to organize and equip the Somali army in anticipation of future conflicts involving the Emirates and Israel in the region.
The directive in Riyadh is clear: give the UAE no breathing room and squeeze them especially through proxies and military actions. It looks like a rupture with no way back.
The Emirates are punching far above their weight, a country of just 9 million people, and the bill is coming due. How do you live off hostility, squeezed between the two Gulf powers? What kind of prosperity will return to the Emirates? The problem isn’t oil, but the distrust that conflicts could flare up again at any moment.
Relations with Qatar have never been good. After the 2017 rupture, the countries signed the Al-Ula Agreement in 2021. In June 2023 embassies reopened and direct flights resumed, but the atmosphere remains one of total distrust.
Displeased with Pakistan’s stance in the war against Iran, the UAE decided to open yet another front. Weeks ago they demanded the immediate return of all their deposits (estimated at $3.5 billion), refusing to renew the deadline for the first time in decades. This came at a fragile moment for Pakistan, which needs to rebuild its foreign reserves as a condition for its IMF bailout.
Once again the Saudis stepped in: they strengthened ties with Islamabad and provided an $8 billion package ($5 billion renewal + $3 billion new deposit).
The Emirates tried to step out of Saudi Arabia’s shadow by developing a more aggressive and independent foreign policy and choosing Israel as their military partner in the region.
It is a bold bet to stand isolated in the Gulf, with both Saudis and Iranians wanting your head, and only questionable support from Qataris and Pakistanis.
This is a profound and nuanced analysis of the shifting power dynamics in the Persian Gulf. The detailed account of the transition from a shared coalition to a strategic rivalry—extending from Yemen to the Horn of Africa—highlights the complexities of modern sovereign interests. The integration of the UAE-Israel security partnership as a catalyst for Saudi realignment is particularly insightful. It raises a critical question: as regional middle powers increasingly pursue 'independent' foreign policies, will the traditional security frameworks of the Arabian Peninsula be permanently replaced by a more fragmented, multipolar order? Thank you for this rigorous overview
LOL: Bessent is all but naming UAE as the target of his secondary sanctions…..they are the ONES trading gold/crypto with Iran…….what they gonna do now?