Trump: Between the Announcement and the Impotence of Escorting Ships in the Strait
In war, no announcements or narratives can withstand the facts generated by the succession of events. The reality of conflict always prevails.
On May 3rd, Donald Trump announced on his social media that he had ordered the U.S. to escort ships through the Strait of Hormuz.
Hours later, Iran announced it had fired two missiles at an American military vessel attempting to cross the strait. The U.S. denied the claim, but they had also denied weeks ago that two destroyers retreated in the strait after receiving orders from Iranian vessels, a fact later proven by the release of audio recordings from the Iranian side.
What are the current chances of Trump ordering American ships to escort vessels through the strait? I would say this could end badly, very badly, reminding me of the operation where two C-130s were targeted and lost along with helicopters.
The Iranian coastline bordering the strait stretches about 350km, filled with positions in bunkers and caves equipped with missile launchers and drones. The width of the strait at the crossing varies from 35 to 80km of shallow waters. American Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) do not even possess the specific vessels required for an escort mission in the strait. Sending destroyers in there, given the current situation, would be insane and likely refused by commanders.
The success rate of the Arleigh Burke’s defense systems, like any other anti-missile system, depends heavily on distance. Projectiles fired from just a few dozen kilometers away reduce these chances because the command center has less time to analyze, predict behavior, and create a data baseline for these missiles to allow for more assertive interceptions. At a distance of a few dozen kilometers, the processing window becomes extremely short, and the chances of interception plummet.
I am saying quite clearly: forcing the opening of the strait using Arleigh Burkes would carry a high risk of catastrophe.
Even if this movement were accompanied by various armed drones and reconnaissance aircraft, the risks would remain immense. Threats range from drones (underwater, surface and aerial) to fast boats, midget submarines, and dozens of anti-ship launchers scattered along the strait.
During the task force deployment against the Houthis in the Red Sea, facing a threat immensely smaller than that in Hormuz, USS Carney sailor Joseph “Papi” Grzybowski described the combat as terrifying, noting: “I would be lying if I said I wasn’t terrified. This is the most real combat the Navy has seen since World War II.” He emphasized that sailors faced immense panic, often having only seconds to react to incoming missiles while navigating extreme emotional and physical exhaustion.
Deploying ships to reopen the strait is not something that can be politicized with impact statements. It is something that genuinely lacks the adequate means and simply cannot be executed right now without a considerable number of casualties and a return to the full-scale war we saw weeks ago.
Considering the entire U.S. Navy military apparatus, there are no more than 700-800 Tomahawks in the region, and only a fraction of them are anti-ship. Virtually all combat against Iranian vessels would have to be carried out by drones. While these drones are efficient in such missions, the loss rate has risen significantly in the last few weeks of the war. Iran is obviously aware of this vulnerability and consistently deploys a few dozen speedboats in the strait, despite having a fleet of at least 1,500 such vessels.
Trump’s options for forcing the opening of Hormuz remain limited, while the pressure on him continues to mount.
Days ago, he stated that no Iranian ship would pass through the blockade, but monitoring from Lloyd'sand Vortexa revealed that between 25 and 35 Iranian ships have broken the blockade in recent weeks. Trump also claimed days ago that Iran had about 72 hours until it had nowhere left to store its oil. In reality, Iran still has at least 30-40 days. While Iran is exporting almost nothing, Chinese loans are capable of financing a large portion of these losses in the short term, giving Iran resilience.
Hours ago, the American president said the U.S. Navy had escorted two ships through the strait, but there are no images or AIS data to make this claim credible.
In war, no announcements or narratives can withstand the facts generated by the succession of events. The reality of conflict always prevails.
Trump remains under increasing pressure. Since the start of the conflict on February 28, 2026, prices have risen by about $1.47 per gallon. The jet fuel crisis that shut down the American carrier Spirit Airlines persists, though it was partially alleviated by China. Hours ago, the Chinese government approved a quota of 500,000 metric tons of refined fuel for May. This volume, while larger than April’s, is still significantly lower than the average of 1.6 million tons recorded last year.
The aviation market will remain strangled, as will fertilizers, natural gas, helium, and the entire oil supply chain. Although the Emirates are investing in the Fujairah pipeline, there are two problems: only about 40-50% of previous total exports can be maintained through this strategy, and furthermore, Iran announced that the strait’s closure zone encompasses the port of Fujairah. Today, May 4th, an Emirati ship was hit 75 nautical miles from the port.
Trump remains pressured and with few options, even as he attempts to portray the opposite.
Solid article as usual Patricia. Am very glad you pointed out the real Iran oil storage capability and the point that Chinese loans can assist, which should be much more widely understood. Just goes to show how low an intellectual level strategic discourse has fallen to in the West that that isn't the case.
What happens after those 30-40 days? Iran just takes the pain from having the wells capped, in a bet that it is less pain than what its adversaries will themselves endure from their asymmetrical tactics?
Best regards, Rafael